SNMP

...Simple Network Management Protocol...

Outline of the SNMP Framework



SNMP Transport Architecture

- UDP
  - „unreliable” transport layer



SNMP Encapsulation



- **UDP Port 161** - SNMP Messages
- **UDP Port 162** - SNMP Trap Messages

Connectionless Protocol

- Because of UDP
- There are no low level guarantees for receiving the management-traffic
- Pro’s
  - Smaller overhead
  - Simpler protocol
- Con’s
  - The Connection-oriented behavior (if needed) must be implemented by the application

SNMP Operations

- **Get-Request(0)** requests a value or set of values from a Management Agent MIB.
- **Get-Next-Request(1)** requests the value of the next lexicographically larger Object Identifier in a MIB tree given the present Object Identifier.
- **Get-Response(2)** is a response from the management agent to the management station supplying the requested values.
- **Set-Request(3)** sets a value (or an action) in the management agent MIB.
- **Trap(4)** is an unsolicited message from a management agent to management station that is initiated by an alarm/event pair on the management agent.

SNMP Message Sequences



(a) Get values



(b) Get next values



(c) Set values



(d) Send trap

Lexicographical Ordering

- is used for **accessing MIB objects serially**
- given the tree structure of a MIB, the OID for a particular object may be derived by tracing a path from the root to the object
- **lexicographical ordering is also referred to as:**
  - preorder traversal (root, left, right) of a tree
  - depth-first search
- **useful for examining MIBs whose structure is not known to NMS**

Lexicographical Ordering Example



SNMP Management Information

- Management Information is modeled as *(managed) objects* and relationships among them.
- A ***MIB (Management Information Bases)*** *is a collection of* objects, grouped for a specific management purpose.
- All objects are organized in the ***global MIB tree****.*
- Each MIB represents a sub tree of this global MIB tree.
- The *leaf objects of the tree contain object instances with* the state and control variables of the managed system.
- Device manufacturers often define their own device specific MIBs.

The Global MIB Tree



MIB Tree Example



SNMP Operations Cont'd

- **Not possible to change the structure of a MIB**
  - cannot add or delete object instances
- **No explicit action is supported**
- **Access is provided only to leaf objects in the MIB tree**
  - not possible to access an entire table or a row of a table with a single atomic action
- **These simplify the implementation of SNMP but limit the capability of the NMS**

The Structure of SNMP Management Information (SMI)

- SMI, the SNMP management information model, provides guidelines for defining MIBs, object types and object identifiers.

- These definitions are written in the language ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation 1).

- ASN.1 includes also rules on how the management information is encoded, i.e., mapped into octet strings.

SNMP PDU Structure



(a) SNMP message



(b) GetRequest PDU, GetNextRequest PDU, and SetRequest PDU



(c) GetResponse PDU



(d) Trap PDU



(e) variablebindings

SNMP Encoding using ASN.1

- CCITT (X.209) and ISO (ISO 8825)

- Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
  - Type-Length-Value (TLV))
  - Recursive structure,
    - «V» can contain another TLV

Encoding a value



Value length is known



Value length is not known at the moment

EOC = 00000000

Identifiers



Class :
00 = Universal
01 = Application
10 = Context specific
11 = Private

P/C :
0 = Primitive type
1 = Constructed type

Tag number :
1 = Boolean type
2 = Integer type
...
> 30 : X...X = tag number

Length


1 byte
0
Length (L)
Short, known length:
1<= L <= 127
1 byte
K bytes
1
K
Length (L)
Long, known length:
128 <= L <= 2^128
1 byte
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unknown length:
ending with EOC

ASN.1 Encoding Example

TYPE	VALUE	ENCODING
INTEGER	-129	02 02 FF 7F
OCTET STRING	«John»	04 04 4A 6F 68 6E
SEQUENCE (INTEGER, INTEGER)	(3, 8)	30 06 02 01 03 02 01 08

Example: Encoding **Get Request**

GET 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (sysDescr)

```
30 27                        SEQUENCE (0x30) 39 bytes
  02 01 00                     INTEGER VERSION (0x2) 1 byte: 0
  04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63    OCTET STRING COMMUNITY (0x4) 6 bytes:
                                                          «public»
  a0 1a                        GET-REQUEST-PDU (0xa0) 26 bytes
    02 02 73 00                  INTEGER REQUEST-ID (0x2) 2 bytes: 29440
      02 01 00                   INTEGER ERROR-STATUS (0x2) 1 byte:
                                                          noError
      02 01 00                   INTEGER ERROR-INDEX (0x2) 1 byte: 0
      30 0e                      SEQUENCE (0x30) 14 bytes
        30 0c                      SEQUENCE (0x30) 12 bytes
          06 08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01 00     OBJECT ID (0x6) 8 bytes:
                                                      1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0
          05 00                          NULL VALUE (0x5) 0 byte
```

Example: Encoding **Get Response**

GET RESPONSE 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (sysDescr = «alphaB...»)

```
30 81 84              SEQUENCE (0x30) 132 bytes
  02 01 00                  INTEGER VERSION (0x2) 1 byte: 0
  04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63       OCTET STRING COMMUNITY (0x4) 6 bytes:
                                                          «public»
  a2 77                     GET-RESPONSE-PDU (0xa2) 119 bytes
    02 02 73 00               INTEGER REQUEST-ID (0x2) 2 bytes: 29440
    02 01 00                  INTEGER ERROR-STATUS (0x2) 1 byte: noError
    02 01 00                  INTEGER ERROR-INDEX (0x2) 1 byte: 0
    30 6b                     SEQUENCE (0x30) 107 bytes
      30 69                       SEQUENCE (0x30) 105 bytes
        06 08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01 00   OBJECT ID (0x6) 8 bytes:
                                                    1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0
        04 5d 61 6c 70 68 61 42 ...     OCTET STRING (0x4) 93 bytes:
                                                    «alphaB...»
```

SNMP Security Concepts

- **Authentication service**
  - agent may wish to limit access to the MIB to authorized managers
- **Access policy**
  - agent may wish to give different access privileges to different managers
- **Proxy service**
  - agent may act as a proxy to other managed devices
  - this may require authentication service and access policy for other managed devices on the proxy
- **SNMP provides only a primitive and limited security capability via the concept of *community***

SNMP Community

- **is a relationship between an agent and a set of managers that defines authentication, access control & proxy characteristics**
- **a community is locally defined by the agent**
  - each community is given a unique community name
  - an agent may establish a number of communities
  - the community name is needed for all get and set operations
  - the same community name may be used by different agents
- **SNMP authentication service**
  - every SNMP message from a manager includes a community name (used as a password) --- very primitive
  - most agents only allow GET operations

SNMP Community Cont'd

- **SNMP Access Policy**
  - an agent can provide different categories of MIB access using the following concepts: **SNMP MIB View** & **Access Mode**
- **SNMP MIB View**
  - a subset of objects within a MIB
  - different MIB views may be defined for each community
  - the set of objects in a view need not belong to a single subtree
- **SNMP Access Mode**
  - an access mode {READ-ONLY, READ-WRITE} is defined for each community
  - the access mode is applied uniformly to all objects in the MIB view
- **SNMP Community Profile**
  - a combination of a MIB view and an access mode

MIB ACCESS Category *vs.* SNMP Access Mode

MIB ACCESS Category	SNMP Access Mode	
	READ-ONLY	READ-WRITE
read-only	Available for get and trap operations	
read-write	Available for get and trap operations	Available for get, set, and trap operations
write-only	Available for get and trap operations, but the value is implementation-specific	Available for get, set, and trap operations, but the value is implementation-specific for get and trap operations.
not accessible	Unavailable	

SNMP RFC's

RFC	Description	Published	Current Status
1065	SMIv1	Aug-88	Obsoleted by 1155
1066	SNMPv1 MIB	Aug-88	Obsoleted by 1156
1067	SNMPv1	Aug-88	Obsoleted by 1098
1098	SNMPv1	Apr-89	Obsoleted by 1157
1155	SMIv1	May-90	Standard
1156	SNMPv1 MIB	May-90	Historic
1157	SNMPv1	May-90	Standard
1158	SNMPv1 MIB-II	May-90	Obsoleted by 1213
1212	SNMPv1 MIB definitions	Mar-91	Standard
1213	SNMPv1 MIB-II	Mar-91	Standard
1215	SNMPv1 traps	Mar-91	Informational
1351	Secure SNMP administrative model	Jul-92	Proposed Standard
1352	Secure SNMP managed objects	Jul-92	Proposed Standard
1353	Secure SNMP security protocols	Jul-92	Proposed Standard
1441	Introduction to SNMPv2	Apr-93	Proposed Standard
1442	SMIv2	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1902
1443	Textual conventions for SNMPv2	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1903
1444	Conformance statements for SNMPv2	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1904
1445	SNMPv2 administrative model	Apr-93	Historic
1446	SNMPv2 security protocols	Apr-93	Historic
1447	SNMPv2 party MIB	Apr-93	Historic
1448	SNMPv2 protocol operations	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1905
1449	SNMPv2 transport mapping	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1906
1450	SNMPv2 MIB	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1907
1451	Manger-to-manger MIB	Apr-93	Historic
1452	Coexistence of SNMPv1 and SNMPv2	Apr-93	Obsoleted by 1908
1901	Community-Based SNMPv2	Jan-96	Experimental
1902	SMIv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1903	Textual conventions for SNMPv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1904	Conformance statements for SNMPv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1905	Protocol operations for SNMPv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1906	Transport mapping for SNMPv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1907	SNMPv2 MIB	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1908	Coexistence of SNMPv1 and SNMPv2	Jan-96	Draft Standard
1909	Administrative infrastructure for SNMPv2	Feb-96	Experimental
1910	User-based security for SNMPv2	Feb-96	Experimental