Stream Ciphers

BMEVITMAV52 Information and Network Security feher.gabor@tmit.bme.hu

Stream ciphers

- Comparison to block ciphers
 - Block ciphers process blocks (64 bits or more)
 - Stream ciphers work on smaller "blocks" usually 1 bit
 - Block ciphers have no memory
 - Stream ciphers need state information (memory) in addition to the key
 - block ciphers + memory (e.g. CFB)
 -> stream ciphers

One-time pad

- Vernam cipher
 - $c_i = p_i XOR k_i$
- There exists a perfect cipher: one time pad
 - Vernam cipher
 - Key should be as long as the plaintext
 - Unconditionally secure (Shannon)
 - But, one-time pad is not feasible due to the long key
- Keystream generation
 - The goal of the stream ciphers is to provide a long pseudorandom keystream based on a smaller key
 - Computationally secure

Binary additive stream ciphers

Synchronous stream ciphers, where the output function is the XOR operation

 Just like Vernam cipher

Most of the stream ciphers are additive stream ciphers

Synchronous stream ciphers


- Definition: keystream is generated independently of the plaintext and ciphertext
- Procedure:

$$-\operatorname{state}_{i+1} = f(\operatorname{state}_i, k)$$
$$-z_i = g(\operatorname{state}_i, k)$$
$$-c_i = h(p_i, z_i)$$

next state function keystream output function

Synchronous stream ciphers 2.

- Properties
 - Sender and receiver must be synchronized
 - Same key and same position
 - Lost synchronization fails decryption
 - Bit insertion/removal or replay attack are recognized
 - Bit errors produce bit errors
 - No error propagation
 - Ideal for lossy communication
 - Attackers know the result of the modifications
- -> OFB is a synchronous stream cipher




Asynchronous stream ciphers

- Self synchronizing stream ciphers
- Definition: keystream is generated from the key and a number of previous ciphertext bits
- Procedure
 - $state_{i} = (c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, ..., c_{i-t})$ $z_{i} = g(state_{i}, k)$ $c_{i} = h(p_{i}, z_{i})$

keystream output function


Asynchronous stream ciphers 2.

- Properties
 - Receiver is capable of recover after lost synchronization
 - Self synchronization after bit insertion/removal
 - Plaintext is unrecoverable during the synchronization
 - Bit errors produce more erroneous bits
 - Limited error propagation: up to t bits
 - Attackers can not be sure about the result of the modifications
 - Plaintext bits influence the rest of the ciphering
- -> CFB is an asynchronous stream cipher



Linear Feedback Shift Registers

- LFSR
 - Consists of L stages storing 1 bit information
 - A clock moves data through the stages -> shift
 - The last stage servers the output
 - The input of the first stage is a feedback, calculated as a modulo sum of a subset of the stages
- LFSR properties
 - Easy hardware implementation
 - Large period
 - Good statistical properties
 - Analysis through algebraic techniques




Maximum length LFSR

- LFSRs are periodic, since states are finite
 - Maximum length LFSR
 - Maximum length LFSR if it produces an output with period 2^{L-1}
 - Linear complexity
 - Linear complexity of s_n denoted as L(s_n) is the shortest LFSR that produces a sequence having s_n as its first outputs


Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers

• Feedback is any function of the stages


• No theory, how to create long periods!



LFSR example



# of Bits	Length of Loop	Taps
2	3 *	[0,1]
3	7 *	[0,2]
4	15	[0,3]
5	31 *	[1,4]
2 3 4 5 6 7	63	[0,5]
	127 *	[0,6]
8	255	[1,2,3,7]
9	511	[3,8]
10	1,023	[2,9]
11	2,047	[1,10]
12	4,095	[0,3,5,11]
13	8,191 *	[0,2,3,12]
14	16,383	[0,2,4,13]
15 16	32,767 65,535	[0,14] [1-2,4,15]
17	131,071 *	[1,2,4,15] [2,16]
18	262,143	[6,17]
19	524,287 *	[0,1,4,18]
20	1,048,575	[2,19]
21	2,097,151	[1,20]
22	4,194,303	[0,21]
23	8,388,607	[4,22]
24	16,777,215	[0,2,3,23]
25	33,554,431	[2,24]
26	67,108,863	[0,1,5,25]
27	134,217,727	[0,1,4,26]
28	268,435,455	[2,27]
29	536,870,911	[1,28]
30	1,073,741,823	[0,3,5,29]
31	2,147,483,647 *	[2,30]
32	4,294,967,295	[1,5,6,31]




FSR based stream ciphers

- LFSR output is easily predictable
- To make the keystream secure:
 - Use nonlinear combination of LFSRs outputs
 - Use nonlinear filtering function on the LFSR output
 - Use LFSR output to clock more LFSRs
- Role of the key
 - Known LFSR connection: the key is the initial state of the LFSR(s)
 - Secret LFSR connection: the key is both the initial state of the LFSR(s) and the connection of the LFSRs
 - More security
 - More complex hardware

Nonlinear LFSR combinations


- Keystream is the nonlinear function of the LFSR outputs
 - Combining function



Nonlinear filtering function


Keystream is a nonlinear combination of the states

- Filtering function




Clock-controlled generators

- Alternating step generator
- Security
 - Maximum length LFSRs L₁, L₂, L₃
 - L₁, L₂ and L₃ pairwise relatively prime
 - $L_1 \approx L_2 \approx L_3 \approx I$
 - Best known attack: 2^I steps



Clock-controlled generators 2.

- Shrinking generator
- Security
 - Maximum length LFSRs: L₁, L₂
 - L₁ and L₂ are relatively prime
 - Output period: $(2^{L2-1}) \cdot 2^{L1-1}$
 - $\quad L_1 \approx L_2 \approx I$
 - Secret connections
 - Best known attack: 2^{2l} steps




If shrinking = 0 then discard LFSR 2 output

Software stream ciphers

- FSR based ciphers are for hardware ciphers, but not good for software ciphers
- There is a need for a fast software cipher
 - SEAL Software Optimized Encryption Algorithm
 - RC4 Ron's Code 4
 - SSL, TLS, WEP, TKIP
 - Block ciphers with OFB, CFB modes of operation

RC4 cipher

• RC4 – Ron's Code 4



RC4 code

Initialization

for i = 0 to 255: $S_i = i$ j = 0; for i = 0 to 255: j = (j + S_i + $K_{i \mod 1}$) mod 256 swap S_i , S_j

Keystream generation


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i = (i + 1) \mod 256

j = (j + S_i) \mod 256

swap S_i, S_j

Out = S[(S_i + S_j) mod 256]
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Speed of ciphers



Zhangxi Tan, Chuang Lin, Hao Yin and Bo Li: OPTIMIZATION AND BENCHMARK OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ON NETWORK PROCESSORS

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